This paper uses a laboratory experiment and real world data to explore individuals' motivations for redistribution. The laboratory results show that as income uncertainty diminishes, participants become more extreme in their preferences for redistribution. The findings suggest that for most people, the motivation for redistribution is financial self-interest---namely as insurance against future bad luck---rather than furthering equity. However, a non-negligible group of participants propose redistribution levels inconsistent with financial self-interest, where this group is primarily made up of those whose financial position is least affected by a non-financially self-interested redistribution proposal, and the size of this group increases when participants can communicate prior to proposing. Data from the GSS show that these experimental findings may help shed light on the ways preferences for redistribution evolve with age.
I -Introduction
Investor Warren Buffet made headlines when he wrote an op-ed article in the New York Times arguing that the very rich should feel obligated to pay more taxes (Buffet 2011) . On the other end of the spectrum, Herman Cain garnered a good deal of support at the beginning of the 2012 U.S. Republican presidential nomination race when he proposed a tax reform scheme that not only aimed to lower tax rates, but also effectively eliminate any progressivity in the income tax system.
While there are several reasons for taxation, including funding public goods and internalizing externalities, much of the current debate revolves around taxation as a means to redistribute earnings and wealth away from those at the top of the distribution towards those at the bottom. There are a variety of motivations for why a population of citizens may demand such redistribution. For example, individual notions of justice may include achieving some desired amount of equality in financial outcomes in a society.
Alternatively, the motivation for redistribution could be more related to financial selfinterest---individuals may see a certain amount of guaranteed redistribution as a form of insurance to protect themselves from possible spells of bad luck in the future.
This paper aims to help shed some further light on the relative strength of these different motivations for redistribution. In particular, this study first considers a laboratory experiment in which participants earn money by successfully completing a series of tasks (e.g., answering vocabulary, math, and trivia questions correctly), where the payoff to a successful task is randomly and differentially determined across participants. Given this earnings generation mechanism, I then consider two primary treatments regarding how participants propose different levels of redistribution of earnings. In the first primary treatment, participants begin by performing tasks and learning their earnings and the earnings of others, after which they are asked to propose a redistribution level. This treatment will be referred to as the Earnings Known treatment.
In the second primary treatment, participants must propose a redistribution level "behindthe-veil of ignorance," or in other words, they must propose a level of redistribution before performing any tasks, knowing anything about what their earnings will end up being, or where their earnings will lie in the subsequent distribution of earnings. This will be referred to as the Earnings Unknown treatment. Under both treatments, all those with earnings above the mean will have some of their earnings taxed away, while all those with earnings below the mean will receive an earnings subsidy, where the tax and subsidy rates are higher under a higher level of implemented redistribution. The implemented redistribution level is determined at random from the distribution of redistribution levels proposed by the participants.
Under the Earnings Unknown treatment, where participants make their redistribution proposals before they know anything about their earnings outcome, those who propose any strictly positive level of redistribution can be motivated either by financial self-interest, namely they propose positive levels of redistribution to act as a form of insurance, or be motivated by some sense of what they feel is a just or more equitable distribution of final earnings. However, under the Earnings Known treatment, where participants propose a redistribution level after their earnings and their place in the earnings distribution are realized, complete financial self-interest would lead participants to propose either no redistribution (for those with earnings above the mean) or complete redistribution (for those with earnings below the mean), where complete redistribution means splitting aggregate earnings equally across all participants. Proposing a level of redistribution that is not one of these two extremes can only be motivated by some demand for a more "fair" or "just" distribution of final payouts. Therefore, comparing the distribution of proposed redistribution levels under the Earnings Known treatment to the Earnings Unknown treatment should give some indication about how much of the demand for redistribution under the future earnings uncertainty implicit in the Earnings Unknown treatment is due to financial self-interest and how much is due to concerns about justice and fairness of outcomes.
The results from this experiment show that under the Earnings Unknown treatment, over eighty-five percent of participants propose a strictly positive amount of redistribution, with most proposing a relatively modest amount of redistribution and less than ten percent proposing complete redistribution. As stated above, any strictly positive proposed redistribution under this treatment could either be motivated by financial selfinterest or by some other sense of justice. By contrast, in the Earnings Known treatment, behavior was very different. Specifically, the distribution of proposed levels of redistribution was bimodal, with roughly seventy percent of participants proposing either complete redistribution or no redistribution whatsoever, with the majority of those who ended up in the upper half of the earnings distribution proposing no redistribution and the majority of those who ended up in the lower half of the distribution proposing complete redistribution.
Given the two treatments differed only in the timing of when participants were asked to propose a level of redistribution, and the vast majority of participants acted with complete financial self-interest under the Earnings Known treatment, these results suggest that for most individuals, the demand for redistribution under the Earnings Unknown treatment was actually motivated by monetary self-interest---namely as a form of insurance against a bad earnings outcome---rather than some desire for a particular distribution of payoff outcomes for the group. However, a small but non-negligible fraction of participants seem to have other motivations besides self-insurance for positive levels of redistribution, as roughly thirty percent of participants chose an interior level of redistribution in the Earnings Known treatment, a choice that cannot have been motivated by pure financial self-interest. This group was primarily made up of those in the middle of the earnings distribution, or in other words, those with the least to lose by not acting with complete financial self-interest.
Interestingly, under a new treatment that was identical in all ways to base Earnings Known treatment discussed above except that where earnings were determined completely at random rather than via correctly answered questions (hereafter referred to as the Earnings Known-Random treatment), behavior with respect to redistribution was essentially identical to the base Earnings Known treatment. However, under a second subsequent treatment, that again was identical to the base Earnings Known treatment except that participants were now allowed to anonymously communicate with each other prior to proposing their preferred amount of redistribution (hereafter referred to as the Earnings Known-Communication treatment), a substantially higher fraction of individuals who ended up in the upper half of the earnings distribution now chose to propose a relatively high level of redistribution rather than zero. This suggests that even a little dialog between "winners" and "losers" can cause the winners to empathize enough with the losers to prefer more redistribution even though it is financially costly to them.
Finally, a further novel aspect of this experimental setup is that it provides direct implications regarding what we should observe in the "real" world outside of the lab. In particular, if preferences for redistribution are primarily driven by financial self-interest, as suggested in the lab experiment discussed above, then as people become more and more certain about where they will end up in the earnings distribution, their preferences for redistribution should move toward the extremes of either preferring a lot of redistribution or preferring very little redistribution. Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), I show that this implication can indeed help us understand how preferences for redistribution evolve with age.
II -Related Literature
Much of the motivation for the experimental environment examined here arises from John Harsanyi (1955) Rawls' argues that from this behind-the-veil of ignorance construct, individuals would agree upon policies that would maximize the well-being of the worst off members of society. While he denoted this outcome as "justice," much of the motivation he gives for why individuals behind-the-veil of ignorance would choose such a criteria is individual risk-aversion to ending up at the bottom of society. Therefore, while Rawls' contends that maximizing the well-being of those worst off in society is what constitutes a just society, this is in some sense based on an argument that free and equal people would agree to this behind-the-veil of ignorance because of a self-interested desire to insure themselves against a very bad outcome.
This behind-the-veil thought exercise has motivated several different experiments in the lab. Most directly, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987a), Eavey (1987b), and Oppenheimer (1990) explicitly try to replicate Rawls' proposed environment and test his conclusions in a laboratory setting.
The main findings of this work show that indeed subjects could generally reach consensus, but subjects do not arrive at the option most closely replicating Rawls' prediction. Namely, rather than maximizing the lowest income, subjects overwhelmingly choose to maximize average income with a floor constraint.
As discussed in the introduction, the experiment developed here also has a type of "behind-the-veil of ignorance" treatment. However, of interest in this paper is in directly comparing how the preferences for redistribution differ between such a behind-the-veil treatment (the Earnings Unknown treatment) and a treatment where individuals choose their preferred level of redistribution after they know where their earnings lie in the overall distribution of earnings (the Earnings Known treatment).
In some ways, the Earnings Known treatment has similarities to a large swath of the experimental literature on altruism and public goods, most notably Dictator experiments (see Camerer 2003 for summary of much of this work). However, one could argue that such Dictator experiments are not necessarily looking at individual's tastes for redistribution in a society, but rather are looking at tastes for altruism or charity within a particular context. In general, the literature on games where subjects must decide how much of their realized wealth to share with others reveals that behavior is very much affected by the way the game is set up. As argued by Levitt and List (2007) , simply considering the relationship between behavior and some form of immutable preferences is too narrow; one must also consider the properties of the situation in question.
1 1 For example, behavior is drastically different when the dictator's decision is framed as taking rather than giving (List 2007) , when dictators are also given the option of taking some of their partner's A very particular example of this is Hayashi (2013) , who exploits a simple, but clever manipulation of the standard Dictator game. Specifically, instead of allocating the "dictator" with all of the endowment and asking him/her to decide how much to share with an anonymous partner, Hayashi varies how much of the overall endowment is allocated to the "dictator" (with the remainder allocated to his/her anonymous partner), and then examines how this initial allocation affects the dictator's choice of the final allocation. His results suggest that "(s)ubjects who are not willing to create extremely advantageous inequality are nonetheless disinclined to remedy such inequality when it arises by chance" (Hayashi 2013, p. 727 ). Rutstrom and Williams (2000) look explicitly at preferences for redistribution in a laboratory framework from a context where each individual knows where he or she lies in the income distribution when he or she proposes a level of redistribution. They find that most subjects propose the level of redistribution that maximizes their own personal payoff, and these proposals do not seem to be affected by how each subjects' initial entitlement is allocated.
Several other papers consider preferences for redistribution outside of the lab. For example, Corneo and Fong (2008) use the 1998 Gallup Poll Social Audit Survey to show that Americans' willingness to pay for a more distributively just society is substantial, and Fong (2001) uses the same data to find evidence suggesting that while self-reported preferences for redistribution are to some extent predicted by financial self-interest, an even stronger predictor are an individual's beliefs about the role of effort and luck in determining outcomes. Relatedly, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Alesina and Ferrara (2005) find that demand for redistribution in the United States depends on not only the extent to which individuals expect to personally benefit or be hurt by redistribution, but also their beliefs regarding what determines where each individual ends up in the income distribution.
Similarly, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Corneo and Gruner (2002) find evidence allotment rather than just sharing some of their own allotment with their partner (Bardsley 2008) , whether the allotments to be shared are "earned" rather than randomly allocated (Krawczyk 2010) , how many people will benefit from the redistribution decision (Andreoni 2007) , when subjects are placed in identifiable groups together (Klor and Shayo 2010) , when the recipient is generally agreed to be "more deserving" (Eckel and Grossman 1996) , and when the dictator is guaranteed greater anonymity (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996) . that individuals' stated demand for redistribution is related to their self-assessed likelihood of being upwardly mobile in Russia and several OECD countries respectively.
Finally, comparing changes in different countries over time, Kerr (2010) finds evidence that suggests higher inequality tends to lead to stronger support for government redistribution.
While these studies are certainly helpful for understanding what determines the demand for redistribution, one inherent constraint in such study designs is that preferences for redistribution are taken from self-reported hypotheticals, rather than obtained via revealed preference. One advantage of the laboratory environment is that preferences for redistribution can be measured through revealed behavior. However, this comes at the cost of questionable external validity (Levitt and List 2007) . Therefore, the study below attempts to not only study revealed preferences regarding redistribution directly through choices made in a controlled lab environment, but also consider and evaluate the implications of this behavior in a setting outside of the lab.
III -Experiment

III(a) -Basic Design
The experiment developed here has two primary treatments that differ only in the timing of when certain decisions must be made. In each round of each treatment, a group of n participants will be asked to complete a series of "tasks" (in the context of the actual experiment, these "tasks" consist of answering different types of questions such as GRE mathematics questions, sport trivia, vocabulary, etc Given a particular implemented redistribution rule p, a player i's net payoff from a given round is then given by
So, for example, suppose player i has task earnings of 12 tokens in a given round and the mean task earnings of all participants in that round is 8 tokens. Then, if player i chose a p = 0.25 and he was chosen to be the random dictator in this round, his net payoff in this round would equal (1-0.25)*12 + 0.25*8 = 11 tokens. Alternatively, if someone else who chose a p = 0.50 was chosen to be the random dictator, then player i's net payoff in this round would be (1-0.5)*12 + 0.5*8 = 10 tokens.
This redistribution mechanism is essentially equivalent to a progressive income tax/subsidy. Specifically, note that the "tax" associated with any given earnings and p can
To determine the implicit tax rate, we can divide this expression by task earnings π i and simplify, giving us
Note, this tax and tax rate will be positive (meaning an individual's net "after-tax" payoff will be lower than his/her task earnings) if π i -π mean > 0, but will be negative (meaning an individual's net "after-tax" payoff will be higher than his/her task earnings) if π i -π mean < 0. Moreover, for those with a positive tax rate, it is straightforward to see from both
equations (2) and (3) that the size of both the tax and the tax rate are increasing in an individual's task earnings π i . Similarly, for those with a negative tax rate, meaning they receive a tax subsidy, the size of this subsidy and the size of this subsidy relative to their earnings is decreasing in an individual's task earnings π i .
III(b) -Primary Treatments
As stated in the introduction above, there are two primary treatments that differ only with respect to timing of decisions and information. In the Earnings Known treatment, participants first learn their rate-rate-of-return on task successes r i for that round, then answer questions (i.e., perform "tasks"), then observe how many successfully answered questions s i they achieve, and finally are told not only what their resultant earnings are for that round, as well as the mean earnings and where their earnings lie in the distribution of all participants earnings for that round.
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After learning all of this, each participant is asked to propose a re-distribution rule p which can vary from zero to one in increments of 0.01.
The other primary treatment is the Earnings Unknown Treatment in which participants must each propose their desired re-distribution rule p before they learn either their rate-rate-of-return on task successes r i , how many task successes s i they achieve, or even the nature of the questions they will be answering that round. In other words, the Earnings Unknown treatment is arguably a Behind-the-Veil type environment.
III(c) -Game Procedures
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate student population at UCLA.
Forty-nine percent were female. When asked "How would you describe your political leanings," two percent answered "extremely conservative," four percent answered "moderately conservative," seventeen percent answered "conservative," twenty-two percent answered "moderately liberal," thirty-one percent answered "liberal", twelve percent answered "very liberal," and the remaining eleven percent answered "none of the above." This distribution suggests this experimental group may be somewhat more liberal than the U.S. population at large, which is not surprising given the age group and social context the subjects live in.
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Two sessions of each primary treatment were conducted, with a total of fortythree distinct participants having participated in each of the two primary treatments.
Each participant participated in only one treatment. A treatment session consisted of one practice round and six "real" rounds. Prior to the practice round, participants were carefully instructed on the rules of the game (for their treatment only), as well as how final payoffs are determined in each round and for the experiment as a whole.
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The type of questions that participants were asked in the "task" completion stage differed by round and only one type of question was asked in any given round. Participants answered questions and made redistribution proposals via a computer. Participants submitted redistribution proposals each round via an electronic slider that moved from zero to one in increments of 0.01. Earnings and payoffs were stated in terms of "tokens," but participants were told at the beginning of the experiment that each token was worth $0.10.
As stated above, in the Earnings Known treatment, participants not only knew their own earnings (in tokens) prior to choosing a redistribution level, but also viewed a screen showing the mean earnings over all participants that round, as well as a listing of the earnings of all participants' that round ordered from smallest to largest with their own earnings highlighted. Participants in the Earnings Unknown treatment were also shown this information, but not until the end of a round after they had made their redistribution decision.
As alluded to in the introduction, the actual redistribution level p that was implemented at the end of each round was chosen at random from all of the participant proposals that round. At the end of each round, participants were informed again of their own earnings from that round, the level of redistribution they proposed, the level of redistribution that was implemented, and their final payoff for that round after redistribution. Figure 1 summarizes the procedures of the two primary treatments. As can be seen, the only difference between them is when participants choose a redistribution rule (step 2 in Earnings Unknown versus step 5 in Earnings Known).
Final experiment payouts were determined by using the net payoffs for each participant from one of the six "real" rounds chosen at random. The mean final earnings participants walked away with was just over $10 plus a $5 show up fee. Median earnings were just under $10, with the top one percent earning in excess of $20 and the lowest 1%
earning just under $4. All these earnings were in addition to a $5 participation payment.
Sessions generally lasted around 45 minutes.
IV -Results
Figure 2 shows the key results coming from the two primary treatments. Looking first at the results for the Earnings Unknown treatment we can see that while participants proposed redistribution rules ranging from zero to one, the bulk of the distribution lies below p = 0.5 with a mean of 0.4 and a median of 0.35. However, it is also notable that less than 15 percent of participants proposed no redistribution whatsoever (i.e., p = 0). As discussed above, the motivations for positive proposed re-distribution rules in this
Earnings Unknown treatment could be either as personal insurance against a subsequent low-earning outcome, or due to preferences over what constitutes a "just" distribution of payoffs, or some combination of the two.
The results under the Earnings Known treatment in Figure 2 look quite different.
Specifically, as Figure 2 shows, the vast majority of participants in the Earnings Known treatment (almost 70 percent) chose a re-distribution rule p equal to zero or one, leading to a mean and median of 0.5 for the proposed redistribution rules. Standard errors (adjusted for multiple observations per person) are shown in parentheses above each bar.
A joint F-test can reject the hypothesis that this distribution is equal to the distribution of proposed redistribution rules under the Earnings Unknown treatment at the one percent level. 6 Essentially, in the Earnings Known treatment, the vast majority of those whose earnings were above the mean earnings in a given round proposed a redistribution rule for that round that entailed no redistribution (p = 0), while those who earned below the mean level of earnings in a given round proposed complete redistribution of earnings (p = 1), or perfect payoff equality, for that round. This can be seen in Figure 3a , which shows the distribution of proposed redistribution rules under the Earnings Known treatment stratified by whether the individual earned more or less than the mean in his or her round.
As can be seen, over 70 percent of those with earnings above the mean proposed no redistribution. Alternatively, only 6 percent of those with earnings above the mean proposed complete redistribution, while almost 60 percent of those with earnings below the mean proposing complete redistribution. Looking at the data a bit deeper, there does not appear to be significant differences in behavior across rounds under either treatment. In particular, Figures 4a and 4b show the distribution of proposed redistribution rules divided between the first three rounds and the latter three rounds, for Earnings Unknown and the Earnings Known treatments respectively. Under both treatments, participants' behavior in the first three rounds appears to be quite similar to the latter three rounds. Indeed, within each treatment, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of proposed redistribution rules is the same in the first three rounds as it is in the latter three rounds at any standard level of significance.
Finally, Table 1 shows that the timing of the redistribution decision did not seem to have any impact on the effort put forth in answering questions. The first two columns of numbers show that the distribution of earnings by round was quite similar across treatments. 7 Moreover, noting that earnings depend not only on the number of correct answers but also the randomly determined rates-of-return for each answer, the second two columns simply shows the distribution of correct answers by round for each treatment. Note that they are almost identical. This result should maybe be expected given the participants did not know what redistribution rule p would actually be implemented, or even the distribution for proposed p's, under either treatment.
IV(a) -Additional Treatments
I also conducted two additional treatments that supplement the base Earnings Known treatment discussed above. The first considers whether the bimodal financial payoff maximizing behavior exhibited in the base Earnings Known treatment was simply a byproduct of the fact that earnings are partially due to the participants' "skill" in answering questions. Namely, while earnings were due to both a randomly determined rate-of-return and correct answers to questions in the base Earnings Known treatment, individuals who obtained high earnings may have felt that their "skill" made it fair for them to keep their entire earnings, while those who obtained low earnings may have focused on the random nature of how earnings were allocated and thereby consider a greater amount of redistribution to be a more favored outcome due to equity principles.
As discussed in Section II, whether earnings/endowments are determined randomly or through some aspect of "skill," or even just the distribution of initial earnings/endowments, has been shown to affect individuals' willingness to redistribute wealth under some experimental setups (Krawczyk 2010; Hayashi 2013 ).
To consider this issue, I ran a further treatment identical in all dimensions to the base Earnings Known treatment described above, but instead of earnings being determined via both the randomly determined rate-of-return on correct answers and the number of correct answers, earnings were entirely determined at random (Earnings Known -Random treatment). Participants simply learned their randomly determined earnings for a given round, and observed the mean and overall distribution of the randomly determined earnings for all participants in that round, and then proposed a Table 2 , these results are robust to using indicators for proposing no redistribution (p = 0) and proposing complete redistribution (p =1) as the dependant variables. Table 4 shows that the results with respect to the impact of earnings on proposed redistribution levels remain essentially unchanged after controlling for round, gender, political leanings, and tolerance for risk as revealed by a stated willingness to gamble.
IV(b) -Regression Analysis
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It is also interesting to note that gender, political leanings, and tolerance for risk do not have any impact on proposed redistribution levels.
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In summary, the vast majority of participants in the Earnings Known treatments appear to be motivated by their own financial self-interest when proposing redistribution levels. However, a small but significant minority of participants appear to be motivated by other concerns. As discussed above, one thing that seems to impact non-financially self-interested behavior is the ability of low earners and high earners to communicate with each other. Table 5 looks at what else potentially impacts such non-financially selfinterested behavior.
Specifically, Table 5 shows the results of regressions where an indicator for whether the participant proposed an "interior" or non-extreme redistribution level (i.e., 0 < p < 1)---an action not consistent with pure financial self-interest---is regressed on participant characteristics, variables capturing the amount the participants' earnings exceeded or fell short of the mean, and a variable measuring how different the participant's earnings were in the previous two rounds.
11
As can be seen, none of the coefficients on gender, political affiliation, or risk-tolerance show statistically significant 9 Specifically, subjects were asked what they would be willing to pay to participate in a coin flip gamble where they would win $100 if the coin landed on heads and nothing if it landed on tails. 10 Table A -1 in the Appendix shows that very similar conclusions are drawn when using "proposed no redistribution (p = 0)" and "proposed full redistribution (p = 1)" are used as the dependant variable. 11 This analysis was only run on data regarding rounds 3 -6.
relationships with such non-financially self-interested redistribution proposals. Moreover, how much variation in earnings the participant experienced in the previous two rounds also did not have a statistically significant relationship with such behavior.
However, the significantly negative coefficients on "Amount above mean" and "Amount below mean" in the Earnings Known -Base and Earnings Known -Random treatments in Table 5 show that, in these treatments, the more a participant's earnings exceeded or fell short of the mean the less likely he/she was to act in a non-financially self-interested manner. By contrast, the small and statistically insignificant coefficients on "Amount above mean" and "Amount below mean" in the Earnings Unknown treatment show that how much a participant's earnings exceeded or fell short of mean earnings was unrelated to whether or not the individuals proposed an "interior" redistribution proposal (as should be expected given they are proposing before such information is known). Finally, the relatively large and statistically significant coefficient on "Amount below mean" in the Earnings Known -Communication treatment shows that the more a participant's earnings fell short of the mean the less likely he/she was to act in a non-financially self-interested manner, but in contrast to the other two Earnings Known treatments, the small and statistically insignificant coefficient on "Amount above mean" reveals that the more a participant's earnings exceeded the mean did not affect his or her likelihood to propose a redistribution rule inconsistent with financial self-interest.
This finding can be seen even more starkly in Figure 7 , which shows the fraction of individuals proposing an "interior" redistribution rule p---a p strictly between zero and one---for the three Earnings Known treatments. Again, financial self-interest would always imply that those with earnings below the mean should propose p = 1, while those with earnings above the mean should propose p = 0, meaning any interior proposal is not consistent with pure financial self-interest. As can be seen, under each of the three treatments, such non-financially self-interested behavior peaks for those with earnings in the middle quintile of the distribution in their round, and falls monotonically with how far earnings are both above and below the mean. However, in the Earnings KnownCommunication treatment, this fall off in non-financially self-interested behavior for participants with earnings above the mean is very tempered relative to the other two treatments.
In general, the results from this experiment suggest that individuals generally see redistribution as a form of insurance. By and large, when given the chance, individuals propose a level of redistribution that maximizes their own financial self-interest. And, as shown by Table 5 and Figure 7 , the relatively small number of participants who appear to be motivated by factors other than self-interest are primarily made up of those who lose very little by behaving in the non-financially self-interested manner.
V -Examining Experimental Implications Outside of the Lab
While applying lab results such as these to settings outside of the lab is always quite speculative, it is indeed important to at least consider the extent to which lab results can help further our understanding of the world outside the lab. One context in which to look at whether the findings from this experiment can help us understand behavior outside of the lab is with respect to how preferences for redistribution evolve with age.
As a person ages, a person becomes less and less uncertain about his or her position in the near future earnings distribution. Therefore, if preferences for redistribution are primarily driven by financial self-interest, as the results of the laboratory experiment suggest, then preferences for redistribution should become more extreme as people age.
To look at this implication, I use data from the 1980 -2010 General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a nationally representative survey of the U.S. non-child population conducted every one or two years since 1972. It is meant to track how Americans' behaviors and attitudes change over time and/or compare to other countries.
In addition to basic demographic information such as age, gender, education, and income, a variety of attitudinal questions are asked including one about preferences regarding the role of government in redistributing income. In particular, the primary question I use for this analysis was eqwlth, which asked:
Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?
While not directly analogous to the redistribution proposals in the experiment discussed above, this question seems to have at least some of the same flavor.
Interestingly, the mean response to this question was quite similar for those age 60-65 to those age 20-25 (3.77 vs. 3.50) . However, Figure 6 shows that the distributions of responses to this question differ substantially across these two age groups. Those age 60-65 are more likely than those age 20-25 to answer one of the extreme choices of 1 or 7. In both cases this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, even when taking account of correlation within survey year (and using the more conservative twosided test). While the difference across age groups with respect to the fraction answering 1 (government ought to reduce income differences between rich and poor) is quite small (0.17 for those age 20-25 vs. 0.22 for those age 60-65), the fraction of those age 60-65 answering 7 (government should not concern itself with reducing income differences) is well over twice that of those age 20-25 (0.16 for those age 60-65 vs. 0.07 for those age 20-25). Hence, preferences for redistribution appear to become more extreme with age.
Moreover, it does not appear that this is simply due to changes in preferences for To analyze this issue in a broader way, I use GSS data for all respondents ages 18 and above to examine how preferences over redistribution varied with age and income in a regression specification. Specifically, I regressed each person's answer to the income redistribution question (eqwlth) on family income, age, an interaction variable between family income and age, and other demographic variables. Recall from the wording of the eqwlth question above, that lower valued answers to this question imply a stronger preference for government to take steps to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, while higher valued answers to this question imply a preference against the government taking such steps.
The regression results are shown in Table 6 . In specification (1), right-hand side variables include only family income, age, and the interaction between family income and age. As can be seen, not surprisingly, the coefficient on family income is significantly positive, meaning higher family income is correlated with less of a desire for the government to redistribute income. Moreover, while the coefficient on age is only marginally statistically significant, the coefficient on the interaction between family income and age is strongly and significantly positive. This implies that as people age, those with higher income indicate a weakening preference for the government to take steps to redistribute income, while those of lower income indicate a stronger preference for the government to take steps to redistribute income.
Specification (2) in Table 6 shows the results of a similar regression to that in specification (1), but adds demographic variables such as an indicators for race, gender, and a college degree, as well as indicators for liberal or conservative political views.
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As can be seen, the inclusion of these other variables mute the coefficient on the interaction between family income and age somewhat, but this coefficient is still positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, meaning the basic qualitative results are unchanged---as people age, their own financial situation is increasingly correlated with their preferences for government income redistribution. These results are particularly surprising given they hold even after controlling for political views, which presumably are also correlated with views on redistribution. While by no means definitive, these results are at least consistent with the results coming from the laboratory experiment.
VI -Summary and Conclusion
The results of the experiment described in this paper show that individuals' revealed preferences for the amount of redistribution of earnings they would like to see implemented depend substantially on the degree to which they know where they will lie in the earnings distribution when they state their preferred redistribution level. When participants were asked to propose a level of redistribution before they knew where they were going to end up in the earnings distribution, the vast majority of participants propose a positive but relatively modest amount of redistribution. By contrast, when participants were asked to propose a level of redistribution after they knew where they ended up in the earnings distribution, the vast majority (roughly seventy percent) of participants proposed either no redistribution or complete redistribution (i.e., perfect payoff equality), depending on whether they ended up in the upper half or the lower half of the earnings distribution. This behavior did not seem to be affected by whether earnings were partially earned through skill at answering questions or determined completely at random.
As argued above, this transition to bimodal preferences for redistribution as uncertainty about where each person will end up lying in the earnings distribution diminishes is generally consistent with financial self-interest being the primary motivator for redistribution. A key "real-world" implication of these experimental findings is that as individuals age, and their uncertainty about where they will end up in the earnings distribution in the near future decreases, their preferences for redistribution should become more extreme---an implication found to be consistent with data from the General Social Survey. Clearly, such differences across age cohorts with respect to demand for redistribution may have important political consequences. For example, these more extreme preferences over redistribution may partially help explain why the elderly population generally has a much stronger voter turnout than the young.
However, while behavior consistent with such financial self-interest was observed from roughly seventy percent of the participants in the lab experiment, there was the nonnegligible remaining thirty percent who did not appear to act with complete financial self-interest. While most of this group who acted without complete financial self-interest was made up of those with the least to lose financially by doing so, this fraction grew to fifty-five percent when anonymous communication was allowed after earnings outcomes were known but before redistribution proposals were made. Almost all of the increase in behavior that was inconsistent with financial self-interest came from individuals who had relatively high earnings who proposed relatively high levels of redistribution, rather than from relatively low earning individuals who proposed lower levels of redistribution.
In conclusion, while some of the experimental literature has shown a relative prevalence of altruistic motives for redistributing wealth in some contexts, for example in dictator games, the results of this paper suggest that in an income tax and transfer context, individuals' motivations for redistribution primarily appear to be as a means to insure themselves against bad outcomes---a finding also consistent with how stated preferences for redistribution evolve with age outside the lab. However, at least in the laboratory, for many people, this purely financially self-interested motivation for redistribution appears to be quite fragile, as even a small amount of anonymous 
Appendix 2 -Instructions to participants for Earnings Unknown Treatment
Instructions to Participants Thank you very much for your participation. Please read the following instructions closely. They describe the game you will be playing and how your final payoff for participating in the experiment will be determined. At no time will you be lied to or misled at any point in the experiment regarding how the experiment will proceed and how your final payoff will be determined.
The Experiment
This experiment will consist of a practice round and six real rounds. In each real round you will be presented a series of questions and given four minutes to answer as many as you can. For each question you answer correctly, you will earn some amount of tokens, where the number of tokens you earn for each correct answer is said to be your "rate-of-return" (ROR) and is a randomly determined number between 2 and 17, which will be revealed to you prior to your answering of questions. So, your earnings in a given round in tokens will equal the number of questions that you answer correctly times your realized ROR for that round. At the end of the experiment, each token will be worth $0.10. This means each correct answer can earn you between $0.20 and $1.70 depending on your realized ROR.
After your four minutes for answering questions are up you will learn your total earnings (in tokens) for that round, as well as where your earnings fit in the overall distribution of all participants' earnings for that round.
However, the key component of this game is that prior to answering any questions or knowing your ROR in a given round, you will be asked to propose a re-distribution rule p, where p is a number between zero and one. Your choice of p works as a re-distribution rule in the following way: at the end of a round, the re-distribution rule p that is proposed by one of the participants in this room will be randomly selected, revealed to all participants, and then implemented by the experiment administrator. If we denote the implemented re-distribution rule as p*, then implementation means that a fraction p* of each participant's earnings for that round will be taken from each of participant and split evenly across all of the participants here today.
Thus, if there were three participants and if a participant i's earnings in a given round are denoted E i , then for a given implemented distribution rule p, participant 1's final payoff from that round will be equal to (1-p)E 1 + p(E 1 + E 2 + E 3 )/3. Note that this is equivalent to (1-p)E 1 + pE Avg . Therefore, if the implemented p is zero, each person's final payoff for that round simply equals his or her earnings from that round. Alternatively, if the implemented p equals one, each person's final payoff for that round will all be identical and equal to the average earnings over all participants in that round. Obviously, if the implemented p is greater than zero and less than one, each person's final payoff for that round will be between his or her own earnings from that round and the average earnings over all participants in that round. Therefore, the lower the implemented re-distribution rule p, the closer each participant's final payoff for that round will be to his or her earnings from that round, while the higher the implemented p, the more equal each participants' final payoff will be to the average earnings across all participants.
To help illustrate how this game works more concretely, consider the following example. Suppose there are three participants: Annie, Bill, and Charlie. In a given round, Annie drew a rate-of-return of 8 and answered 5 questions correctly, meaning her earnings for that round were 40 tokens. Similarly, suppose Bill drew a rate-of-return of 4 and answered 8 questions correctly. This would mean his earnings that round were 32 tokens. Finally, suppose Charlie drew a rate-of-return of 2 and answered 10 questions correctly, meaning his earnings for that round were 20 tokens. Now, suppose Annie proposed a re-distribution rule p equal to 0, Bill proposed a p equal to 0.25, and Charlie proposed a p equal to 0.75. Given these choices and the above earnings, if Annie's proposed p (equal to 0) turns out to be the randomly selected re-distribution rule that is implemented, no tokens will be re-distributed. Therefore, in this scenario, each person's final payoff from that round will simply equal his or her earnings from that round, meaning Annie will have a payoff of 40 tokens that round, Bill will have a payoff of 32 tokens that round, and Charlie will have a payoff of 20 tokens that round.
Alternatively, if Bill's proposed p (equal to 0.25) is randomly selected to be the redistribution rule that is implemented, then 25% of each person's earnings are re-distributed equally to everyone, so Annie's payoff for that round will equal ( 
Round Progression and Final Payoff for Participation in this Experiment
As stated previously, this experiment will consist of one practice round and six "real" rounds. Each round will follow the procedure listed above. The only difference across rounds will be the type of questions asked. While the practice round will contain all types of questions, in the subsequent real rounds, questions will all be of a certain type for a given round but will differ across rounds. For example, questions in one round may all relate to vocabulary, while in the next round may all relate to mathematics, and the next round may all relate to movie trivia. Furthermore, rounds will all be completely independent. Your performance, your ROR, or your choice of a re-distribution rule in one round will have no relation to what happens in subsequent rounds.
At the end of all the rounds, one of the "real" rounds will be randomly selected to be the one that "counts," meaning each participant will receive his or her payoff from that round as his or her final payoff for the experiment, where each token is worth $0.10. You will also earn a $5 participation fee just for being here today. conservative 0.678*** (0.033) Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, and * significance at 10%. Omitted political view is moderate (includes "slightly conservative," "middle of the road moderate," and "slightly liberal"). 
Figure 1 -Summary of Game Procedures under Primary Treatments
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